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Carla Manzanas  
Movement, Security and Media 
Migration and the movement of people have characterized humankind for 
centuries, and will continue to be so as long as there is life in our planet. 
The current shape and structure of our societies would not be possible 
without the desire and the need to go further to explore what is beyond the 
horizon. The decision of leaving behind the motherland can be motivated 
by several reasons which have been changing and evolving through history. 
From tribes and groups to individual journeys, migration is essentially the 
movement towards a better life, “an exercise in hope”.1 
From colonialism through slavery to economic migration, the movement of 
people around the globe constitutes a prominent part in the creation of 
current nations, states and societies. How this phenomenon is perceived 
and understood among communities varies throughout history, having 
mainly an economic emphasis some decades ago and becoming today a 
security issue.  
The western part of Europe started to experience a new kind of influx and 
population movement after the end of World War II. The rise of capitalism 
introduced a new migration paradigm, essentially urged by labor and 
economic migrants. 2  The idea that with the introduction of capitalism 
freedom would reign and allow all mankind to freely relocate in a new part 
of the world is still today an abstract idea applying only to certain 
collectives.  
 
1  Bonnici, Ugo Mifsud , Migration in the Mediterranean: Introductory Observations, 
in: Grech, O./Wohlfeld, M. (eds.), Migration in the Mediterranean: Human Rights, 
Security and Development Perspectives, Malta: MEDAC, 2014: 1-14. 
2  Castles, Stephen/Miller, Mark J., The Age of Migration, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009. 
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According to the UNHCR annual report on Global Trends, in 2014 the 
numbers of forced displacement reached almost 60 million, an amount that 
roughly equals the population of Italy or the United Kingdom.3 As the 
report calls them, the “nation of the displaced” would make the 24th largest 
country in the world.  
The global numbers published by the United Nations are often perceived as 
abstract and far away from the European reality, not even thinking that 
behind those numbers there are 60 million stories, 60 million individuals 
coerced to abandon everything. Despite the distance that some Europeans 
feel, several refugees and asylum seekers cross the Mediterranean 
throughout their journey. In October 2015, 218,0004 people crossed the 
Mare Nostrum, an amount of people that almost equals number of refugees 
arriving in southern Europe during the whole of 2014 (220,000 refugees 
and migrants).5 The year 2015 amounts by the end of November almost 
900,000 arrivals by sea.6 Most of them arrive to Greek shores and islands, 
continuing their journey through Macedonia, Serbia and Croatia. More than 
3,500 migrants and refugees have lost their lives at sea or are missing 
during the year 2015.7  
The European Union and more concretely those Member States coasting 
the Mediterranean are directly affected by the abovementioned events, 
urging for a response up to the task and to the dramatic situation. While it 
is true that the Treaty of Lisbon foresees some provisions and Articles 
dedicated to the common policy on border checks, asylum and 
immigration 8 , little effort has been done at the supranational level, 
especially regarding the human dimension of the issue. Countries like Italy, 
Greece and Malta have been confronted with economic and logistic 
 
3  UNHCR, World at war: Global Trends – Forced displacement 2014. Online at: 
http://unhcr.org/556725e69.html. Last date of access: 27.07.15.  
4   UNHCR, Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response – Mediterranean. Online at: 
http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php. Last date of access: 28.11.15. 
5  Ibid (3). 
6  Ibid (4). 
7  Ibid (4). 
8  See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Chapter 2: Policies on 
Border Checks, Asylum and Immigration. 
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challenges when tackling the arrival of boats and migrants to their coasts, 
trying with limited success to persuade the upper half of the Union to share 
the responsibility of the situation.9  
Since the Arab Spring in 2011, the number of people crossing the 
Mediterranean has increased. The pictures of people in tiny, decayed, 
overfilled boats have travelled around the world, becoming a part of our 
daily news review. As pointed out earlier, the perception of migration has a 
changing nature, strongly influenced by political approaches and media. 
Power elites and media engage in a feedback where the former would not 
have such impact among the population without the reinforcing of 
newspapers, television and radio. 10  In addition, mass media do not 
constitute a harmless, passive way of reproducing political messages; 
instead, they play an active and powerful role in the construction of 
meaning, ideas and judgements in the society.11  
Concerning migration and more concretely the flows and events taking 
place in the Mediterranean, media have played a crucial role in the 
portrayal of people arriving to the shores of southern Europe. The lack of 
context and perspective in media reporting usually implies a generalization 
of “the migrant”, classified as a threat and danger that directly leads to a 
misleading construction of the reasons and consequences of migration in 
the Mediterranean.12 The political discourse regarding migration in general 
and in the Mediterranean in particular has been focusing on defensive 
connotations that have put the issue on the top of the security agenda. The 
securitization framework developed by the Copenhagen School of 
International Relations has widened the range of issues and threats that can 
be included in the security agenda, migration among them.13 During the last 
decade, governments have been obsessed with the idea of creating a 
 
9  Bonnici, op. cit., 1-14. 
10  Van Dijk, Teun, Elite discourse and racism, USA: SAGE Publications, 1993: 241. 
11  Ibid (7). 
12  Saracino, Daniel, Media-Conflict-Migration – The conflict potential of the media 
coverage regarding migration from the countries of the Arab Spring to Europe, 
Bonn: IFA- Research Programme, 2013. 
13  Buzan, Barry/Waever, Ole, et al., Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda 
in Europe, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993. 
Carla Manzanas 
 
4 
 
fortress of their sovereign states. Reducing legal ways to enter the countries 
and building physical barriers to “discourage” migrants to seek for a better 
future are currently seen as a normal and justified practice in Europe.14 The 
word migration has been linked to negative connotations by the way in 
which media and public authorities have tackled the issue. Why is that? 
How do political and media discourses have an effect on the creation of 
meaning and attitude towards newcomers?  
An analysis of the securitization theory by the Copenhagen School of 
International Relations, an overview of the measures taken by the European 
Union regarding the current migration situation in the Mediterranean and 
an examination of the way newspapers have reported the issue according to 
discourse and persuasion techniques developed by Teun A. van Dijk, will 
provide the necessary information to be able to answer some of the 
abovementioned questions.  
1. Migration: an overview 
The international migration report 2013 of the United Nations estimates 
around 232 million of migrants worldwide, representing the 3.2 % of the 
total world population.15 This number has increased over the last decades, 
accounting around 175 million in 2000 and 154 million in 1990. The top 
five countries in 2013 with the largest amount of international migrants are 
the United States of America (46 million), the Russian Federation (11 
million), Germany (10 million), Saudi Arabia (9 million) and the United 
Arab Emirates (8 million).16 Globalization has made it easier for people to 
travel and settle down in new countries. The internationalization of 
 
14  Thompson, Caryl, Frontiers and Threats: Should Transnational Migration Be 
Considered a Security Issue? Global Policy Journal, 2013.  
Online at: http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/20/11/2013/frontiers-and-
threats-should-transnational-migration-be-considered-security-issue. Last date of 
access: 10.12.2015. 
15  United Nations, International Migration Report, 12/2013, Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs, 2013. Online at: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/ 
 population/publications/pdf/migration/migrationreport2013/Full_Document_final.p
df. Last date of access: 10.12.2015. 
16  Ibid (12). 
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companies and businesses allows for greater mobility at lower prices. This 
fact has also diversified the reasons and types of migration in our planet: 
from students through economic migrants till asylum seekers and refugees 
fleeing from their countries due to war and violent conflict.  
Between the years 2000 and 2010, the international migrant stock raised 
twice as fast than during the previous 10 years. However, the time period 
from 2010 to 2013 has experienced a slowdown in the increase of migrant 
stock. 17  Women account for almost 50% of all international migrants. 
Europe has the highest rate of migrant women, representing 51.9%, and 
Asia the smallest one with 41.6%18. 
In the year 2013, the total number of refugees in the world was calculated 
at 15.7 million, representing 7% of all international migrants19. This figure 
can be surprising if compared with the alarmist discourses and messages 
politicians and media have been sending in Europe for the past years. The 
terms “invasion” or “migrant flood” give the impression that the entire 
African continent is moving to Europe. However, the official figures show 
that South-South migration, i.e. migrants born in the global South residing 
in the global South, exceeds South-North migration, i.e. migrants born in 
the global South residing in the global North.20 
2. Migration in the Mediterranean 
The sea has always been a place of exchange. Trade, culture and war have 
been present in the waters of the Mare Nostrum. Conflict and progress have 
featured this part of the world from the Egyptians, Phoenicians and Greeks 
all the way to the Roman Empire and its private lake until the Arab 
eruption and the endless struggle for territory between Christians and 
Muslims. There has been as much conflict as trade and business, as much 
 
17  See OECD, World Migration in Figures, October 2013.  
Online at: http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/World-Migration-in-Figures.pdf. 
Last date of access: 10.08.2015. 
18  Ibid (14). 
19  Ibid (14). 
20  Ibid (14). 
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invasion as agreement and influence. With the opening of the Suez Canal, 
the sea gained importance and linked the Western and Eastern civilizations.  
Up until today, the waters of this sea have served as a connection between 
the South and the North, the East and the West.  
Migration routes in the Mediterranean have evolved during the decades and 
nowadays there are three main routes across the Mediterranean: the 
western, central and eastern Mediterranean route. The first one serves as a 
passage from North African countries to the Iberian Peninsula, as well as 
the route through Melilla and Ceuta. The highest numbers of migrants are 
from Morocco or Algeria, but in the past years, many Sub-Saharan 
Africans have also used this way to enter the EU.21 In 2005, many people 
tried to climb the fence separating Melilla from Morocco to access Spanish 
territory. The actions taken by the Spanish government were highly 
criticized by NGO’s and human rights advocates. The years 2011, 2012 and 
2013 experienced an increase in the number of people crossing the borders 
towards Spain.22 In 2014, due to conflicts in many countries in the African 
continent, the flow experienced an increase as well as the causes for people 
to leave their homeland. Irregular border crossing for 2014 in this route 
amounted 7,840. From January to September 2015, the number goes up to 
10,454 people.23  
The central Mediterranean route has been one of the most transited since 
the Arab Spring in 2011, accounting 170,760 people crossing the border to 
the EU using this route in 2014.24 For that year, it was the most used one. 
The route refers to the migratory flow from North-Africa to Italy and 
Malta. Migrants often travel to Libya and embark in boats aiming at a 
better future. This route is very used due to its closeness to Lampedusa and 
Malta, mainly attracting people from Tunisia, Nigeria, Somalia and 
 
21  See FRONTEX, Western Mediterranean Route. Online at: http://frontex.europa.eu/ 
 trends-and-routes/western-mediterranean-route/. Last date of access: 28.11.2015. 
22  Ibid (21). 
23  Ibid (21). 
24  See FRONTEX, Central Mediterranean Route. Online at: http://frontex.europa.eu/ 
 trends-and-routes/central-mediterranean-route/. Last date of access: 28.11.2015. 
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Eritrea. 25  From January to September 2015, there have been 140,705 
irregular border crossings through this route.26 
The eastern Mediterranean route is currently the one accounting more 
movement. Since the beginning of the year 2015 until September 2015, 
almost 600,000 persons have crossed the border.27 This route is mainly by 
land and goes through Turkey to Greece or Cyprus. Due to the current wars 
and conflicts, Syrian refugees, Afghans and Iraqi nationals are the most 
numerous group.  
A part from the actual crossings, unfortunately, something that becomes 
more and more common are the deaths at sea when taking these routes 
towards Europe. Such is the number that the Mediterranean has become the 
deadliest region for migrants. By November 27th 2015, 3,551 people have 
drowned or are missing at sea.28 This number already exceeds the total 
number of deaths in 2014 – 3,279 people. 29  These numbers are only 
estimated amounts of people, assuming that all vessels carrying migrants 
have been detected and found.  
3. Migration and the European Union 
3.1 The legal framework 
The agenda of the European Union on migration and human movement is 
often confusing and unclear about responsibilities, distribution of tasks and 
competencies. In order to comprehend the current events in the 
Mediterranean, an overview of how migration policy works in the 
European Union is crucial. The Treaty of Lisbon includes some general 
 
25  Ibid (24). 
26  Ibid (24). 
27  See FRONTEX, Central Mediterranean Route. Online at: http://frontex.europa.eu/ 
 trends-and-routes/central-mediterranean-route/. Last date of access: 28.11.2015. 
28  International Organization for Migration, Missing Migrants Project.  
 Online at: http://missingmigrants.iom.int/. Last date of access: 29.11.2015. 
29  Brian, Tara/Laczko, Frank, Fatal Journeys-Tracking lost lives during migration, 
International Organization for Migration, 2014. Online at: https://publications.iom. 
 int/system/files/pdf/fataljourneys_countingtheuncounted.pdf. Last date of access: 
10.12.2015. 
Carla Manzanas 
 
8 
 
provisions and also some Articles concerning the management of 
migration, asylum and border checks.  
Article 3 (2) TEU talks about internal and external movement of people 
aiming at creating “an area of freedom, security and justice without internal 
frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured” for its 
citizens, as well as the development of “appropriate measures with respect 
to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and 
combating of crime”. This text allows us to identify two kind of movement: 
internal and external. The first one should be free and ensured for the EU 
citizens. The second one refers to a common development of third country 
people migration into the Union.  
In the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) we find 
under Title V the Articles dedicated to the “Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice”. Article 67 TFEU states that the Union “shall constitute an area of 
freedom, security and justice”. As mentioned above, internal borders have 
to be inexistent and the Member States “shall frame a common policy on 
asylum, immigration and external border control, based on solidarity 
between Member States, which is fair towards third-country nationals”. 
Paragraph three includes the necessity of combating crime, racism and 
xenophobia. Article 79 TFEU refers to illegal migration, aiming at 
preventing and combating it. In the same Article under paragraph 3, a third 
country agreement clause can be found in order to enact readmission 
procedures of migrants to their country of origin. Article 80 TFEU refers to 
the solidarity between Member States concerning implementation of 
migration policies, solidarity and responsibility sharing when it comes to 
border checks, asylum and immigration.  
Although the aim and perspective that the EU adopts in this subject sounds 
fair, solidary and peaceful, many of the tasks still remain in hand of 
national governments.30 This is the case for labor migration – legal aspects 
and volumes of admission of third-country nationals seeking for work.  
 
30  Pace, Roderick, Migration in the central Mediterranean, Jean Monnet Occasional 
Papers, N. 2, Malta: Institute for European Studies, 2013. Online at: 
https://www.um.edu.mt/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/179058/JMProfPacePaperMigr
ation022013webv3.pdf. Last access of access: 10.12.2015. 
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To sum it up, the real powers of the European Union concerning migration 
relate to (1) third-country nationals entering and residing in the Union, (2) 
fighting against irregular migration and (3) readmission agreements with 
third countries.  
3.1.1 Common European Asylum System 
The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is the framework in 
which the Union has developed some standards and guarantees for the 
protection of refugees inside the Union. The bulk of rules concerning this 
matter have been approved through secondary law – directives and 
regulations. Up to this day, there are five pieces of secondary legislation in 
force: the revised Asylum Procedures Directive focusing on asylum 
decisions as well as protection of the applicants; the revised Reception 
Conditions Directive, which is aimed at ensuring enough humane material 
and preserve the fundamental rights of the concerned persons; the revised 
Qualification Directive, dealing with international protection and 
integration measures; the Dublin Regulation which establishes the 
responsible State for examining the asylum application; and the revised 
EURODAC Regulation, with the purpose of preventing, detecting or 
investigating serious crimes.31 Regulations are of direct effect and there is 
no need to transpose them into national law. That means Member States 
have little leeway to modify the procedures. Directives, on the other hand, 
need transposition. The EU sets the goals in the directive and the Member 
States enact laws to achieve those objectives. The way in which those will 
be reached is up to the national parliaments, leaving more space for 
maneuver. In order to ensure a minimum of coherence in the laws approved 
by the countries, in 2005 some steps were taken32: The introduction of the 
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) has the objective of 
 
31  See European Commission, Common European Asylum System, Migration and 
Home Affairs, 2015. Online at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm. Last date of access: 10.12.2015.  
32  Manrique Gil, Manuel/Barna, Judit et al., Mediterranean flows into Europe: 
Migration and the EU’s foreign policy, Brussels: DG External Policies, European 
Union, 2014. Online at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/briefing_ 
 note/join/2014/522330/EXPO-JOIN_SP(2014)522330_EN.pdf. Last date of access: 
10.12.2015. 
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creating a political and legal framework to improve the organization of 
legal immigration, combating illegal immigration and promoting 
international asylum.33 The GAMM is an international cooperation tool that 
includes the European Union – European Commission, European External 
Action Service, the Member States and EU Delegations, third countries and 
migrants themselves with a budget of €1 billion for the period 2004-2013. 
During these years, more than 400 migration-related projects have been 
proposed to foster the goals of the initiative, but it has been difficult to 
implement them because of the multiple and diverse stakeholders.34 One of 
the obstacles for the accomplishment of the GAMM has been the 
exaggerated security-oriented approach that the EU has towards external 
mobility into the Union. This attitude often clashes with the stated and said-
to-be core values of the European project.35 
In 2008, after the Green Paper Consultation of 2007, the European 
Commission presented the Policy Plan on Asylum.36 Even if the purpose of 
the plan is to increase harmonization of asylum legislation among Member 
States as well as improve “solidarity and sense of responsibility”37 between 
EU countries, the practical implementation of these policies tends to be 
disappointing. One of the current criticisms is the contradiction between the 
Dublin System and the burden or responsibility sharing, which is still not 
clear and up to today there are no signs to be willing to reform either one or 
the other.  
3.1.2 The Dublin system 
In June 1990, the Dublin Regime was officially established after the Dublin 
Convention took place. Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
 
33  See European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, Global Approach to 
Migration and Mobility. Online at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/international-affairs/global-approach-to-migration/index_en.htm.  
 Last date of access:  on 10.12.2015. 
34  Ibid (33). 
35  Ibid (33). 
36  See European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, Common European 
Asylum System, Online at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/asylum/index_en.htm, June 2015. Last date of access: 10.12.2015. 
37  Ibid (36). 
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Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the 
United Kingdom signed the text that would determine the responsible 
country for the management of asylum applications and protection under 
the Geneva Convention and under EU law. 38  It would posteriorly be 
replaced by the Dublin II Regulation adopted in 2003 and once again by the 
Dublin III Regulation, which came into force in June 2013.  
The purpose of the regulation is to settle the rules for asylum applications 
in the EU. It states which Member State is responsible for the examination 
and approval or denial of the asylum seekers. This law establishes that the 
asylum seeker must apply for the status in the country where they first 
entered the European Union – the “State of First Arrival rule”. The way in 
which this will be proved and bureaucratized is through the fingerprints of 
the migrant.  
The intention of this regulation is to ensure that one Member State is 
responsible for the examination of the asylum application and that the 
migrant will have access to a clear and efficient system.39 Furthermore, the 
agreement tries to avoid several applications in different Member States, 
preventing the so-called “asylum shopping”.  
Although in principle the aim is to protect the asylum seeker and have a 
well-defined framework, the Dublin system often works in detriment of the 
new comer, especially in the events taking place in the Mediterranean.40 
Currently, under the jurisdiction of the Dublin Regulation, countries like 
Greece or Malta have a disproportionate level of asylum applications to 
take care of, often without the proper means and structures to ensure and 
safeguard the living conditions of the applicants. The conditions 
established by the Dublin Regulation turn into a loss-loss situation for both 
 
38  Council regulation (EC), No. 343/2003 of February 2003 establishing the criteria 
and mechanism for determining the Member State responsible for examining an 
asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national. 
39  See European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Dublin Regulation – What is the 
Dublin System? Online at: http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-work/protection-in-
europe/10-dublin-regulation.html. Last date of access: 10.12.2015.  
40  Ibid (33). 
Carla Manzanas 
 
12 
 
the country and the migrant. 41  In the case of the Mediterranean, the 
countries with more volume of arrivals are often those with less developed 
and solid asylum examination systems such as Greece or Italy. For the 
asylum seeker, the country of entrance can only be considered to be a 
country of transit towards another state – due to family, language 
knowledge, political reasons, etc. – but the current regulation does not 
allow an application in the desired country, since her or his fingerprints will 
be registered in the country of arrival. What these rules have triggered is a 
situation in which asylum seekers try to get to other Member States but are 
sent back to the country of arrival as soon as they are identified. In some 
cases the desperation of being sent back leads people to burn their fingers 
in order not to be identified.42  
The well-functioning and fairness of this regulation has already been 
contested before the European Court of Human Rights and before the Court 
of Justice of the European Union. In the first case, the ECHR issued a 
judgement on January 2011 concerning the violation of human rights when 
applying the Dublin Regulation.43 The Court ruled that Belgium breached 
Articles 3 and 13 of the European Convention of Human Rights by 
exposing the asylum applicant to risks arising from the deficient asylum 
procedure in Greece and the living conditions there.44 
Later the same year, the CJEU mentioned in the ruling of Joined Cases C-
411/10 and C-493/10 that Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union would be violated in the case that one Member State 
 
41  Mouzourakis, Minos, ‘We need to talk about Dublin’ – Responsibility under the 
Dublin System as a blockage to asylum burden-sharing in the European Union, 
Working Paper Series No. 105, University of Oxford,  Refugee Studies Centre, 
2014. Online at: http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/publications/working-paper-
series/wp105-we-need-to-talk-about-dublin.pdf/. Last date of access: 10.12.2015. 
42  Grant, Harriet and Domokos, John, Dublin Regulation leaves asylum seekers with 
their fingers burnt, in: The Guardian, 07.10.2011. Online at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/oct/07/dublin-regulation-european-
asylum-seekers. Last date of access: 10.12.2015.  
43  Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
Greece, Application no. 30696/09, 21 January 2011. Online at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d39bc7f2.html. Last date of access: 02.08.2015 
44  Ibid (43). 
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would send back an asylum seeker to a country in which his or her life 
would be “subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment”45, considering scanty resources or structures in the asylum 
examination process a degrading and inhuman treatment. 
3.2 The aftermath of the Arab spring in the EU migration policy 
The upheavals in some Northern African countries at the end of 2010 such 
as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria among others triggered the cooperation 
between Member States to create a common border control and 
management.  
Legal migration towards Europe experienced an increase in 2011, but did 
not suppose a significant break compared to the previous years. The past 
five to ten years have shown a rise in the number of people immigrating to 
Europe from Northern Africa. The number of migrants has increased in 
2011 to 90,839, almost 70,000 in 2010 and more than 100,000 in 2009.46 In 
addition, migration from Morocco represented the 72% of the increase for 
the year 2011, a country where riots and demonstrations did not have the 
revolutionary strength compared to others.47  
On the other hand, irregular migration crossing the Mediterranean shot up 
in the spring of 2011, recording 42,807 persons irregularly entering Italy by 
sea. In 2010 the number represented less than 5,000 people and less than 
10,000 in 2009.48 A more in-depth analysis of the reasons of the increase 
leads us to identify some explanations: first, the disorganization of police 
forces during the year 2011 made it easy for smugglers to circumvent 
coastal controls in Tunisia. Second, due to the revolutions in many north-
African countries, many migrants decided to change their routes and take 
advantage of the confusion and chaos. This suggests a phenomenon of 
 
45  See Article 4, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.  
46  Fargues, Philippe/Fandrich, Christine, Migration after the Arab Spring, MPC RR, 
San Domenico di Fiesole: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European 
University Institute, 09/2012. Online at: http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/ 
 MPC%202012%20EN%2009.pdf. Last date of access: 10.12.2015. 
47  Ibid (46). 
48  Ibid (46). 
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rerouting the already existing flows of irregular migration rather than an 
increase in the number of people.49 
In December 2013, the European Council calls for the establishment of an 
EU Maritime Security Strategy, adopted in June 2014 with the prospect to 
“provide a common framework for relevant authorities at national and 
European levels to ensure coherent development of their specific policies 
and a European response to maritime threats and risks”50. Independently of 
what threat and risks mean, the fact is that the Arab spring provoked a shift 
in the European policies developed up to now in the Mediterranean. The 
past decades have been characterized by the absence of solid and serious 
EU projects aimed at developing the Mediterranean region. Currently, the 
feeling is that the institutions just turned towards the Mediterranean Sea to 
develop military and security initiatives. 
Among the security actions taken, the “Integrated Border Management” is 
one of them. The objective is to create more synergies between the 
responsible actors to tackle irregular migration and it consists of two 
elements:  
 The first one is Frontex, the European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States 
of the European Union. Founded in 2004, this body is aimed at 
strengthening the cooperation in the area of migration, asylum and 
security.51 It is of military nature and with the mission of “safeguarding 
internal security” from “organized crime”.52 In 2011, Frontex was reformed 
as a response to the revolutions in North-Africa. In this context, Italy 
implemented in 2013 a national Search and Rescue (SAR) operation to 
have control of the movement in the Mediterranean and avoid human 
catastrophes such as the Lampedusa tragedy on 3rd October 2013. The 
Mare Nostrum operation – an Italian initiative – amounted to a monthly 
 
49  Ibid (46). 
50  See European Commission, Maritime Security Strategy – What is it? Maritime 
Affairs. Online at: http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/maritime-security/ 
 index_en.htm. Last date of access: 10.12.2015.  
51  See Frontex, Origin. Online at: http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/origin/. 
 Last date of access: 31.07.2015. 
52  Ibid (51). 
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sum of € 9 million, saving around 150.000 migrants and safely taking them 
to Europe.53 The Mare Nostrum operation was substituted at the end of 
2014 by Triton, a Frontex run project with a monthly budget of € 3.5 
million, less than the half of the previous one. More than a SAR initiative, 
Triton’s operations had a military approach, focusing on border security.  
Such military-centered response from the EU and some Member States, 
suggests that the issue is seen as a threat to the integrity of Europe. Frontex 
is the chosen tool to deal and solve the current problematic in the southern 
shores of the EU, forgetting the human aspect and perspective of what is 
actually happening on a daily basis in the sea: children, women, men 
drowning for wanting to seek a better future, a decent life.  
 The second component is Eurosur, an information exchange system 
to improve the management of EU’s external borders formally launched in 
2008. The cooperation between EU countries and neighboring states should 
improve the reaction and capability of combating cross-border crime, 
irregular migration and preventing loss of lives at sea. 54  Eurosur’s 
surveillance tools should increase the awareness of migrant movements in 
the Mediterranean to avoid more human losses. The justification that 
increasing the number of control mechanisms the events of 3rd October 
2013 could have been avoided, rouses some criticism55: Due to the limited 
legal ways of entering the European Union and the increased surveillance 
of military bodies in the Mediterranean, migrants take more dangerous 
routes to avoid being detected, which leads to a higher risk for the person’s 
life, meaning higher possibilities of experiencing events like the 
Lampedusa one.56  
 
53  See Marina Militare, Mare Nostrum Operation. Online at: 
http://www.marina.difesa.it/EN/operations/Pagine/MareNostrum.aspx. Last date of 
access: 31.07.2015. 
54  See Frontex, Eurosur. Online at: http://frontex.europa.eu/intelligence/eurosur/.  
 Last date of access: 31.07.2015. 
55  Heller, Charles/Jones, Chris, Eurosur: saving lives or reinforcing deadly borders? 
in: Statewatch Journal, 02/ 2014. Online at: http://database.statewatch.org/ 
 article.asp?aid=33156. Last date of access: 01.08.2015.  
56  Ibid (55). 
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The usage of these kinds of mechanisms and tools turns the migrant into a 
criminal, often resulting in a violation and breach of human rights. Almost 
the 30 Articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are violated 
either by the country of origin of the migrants or by the European/national 
authorities in the case of the Mediterranean.  
In addition to the reforms of Frontex and the implementation of Eurosur, 
the Integrated Border Management project counted with a special mission 
in Libya, the EU Border Assistance Mission  (EUBAM). The cooperation is 
aimed at “improving and developing the security of the country’s 
borders”.57 The intention was to increase border control in the countries of 
origins so the vessels would not be able to easily set sail. Nevertheless, this 
country of origin initiative has been downsized due to the current situation 
in Libya’s neighboring countries.  
Still another militarized cooperation between the EU and some countries of 
North Africa is the Seahorse Mediterranean network, the continuation of 
Seahorse Atlántico launched in 2006. The aim is to train and give courses 
for coastal and border monitoring in countries such as Libya, Algeria, 
Tunisia or Egypt. 
It can repeatedly be noticed that most of the in-place initiatives from 2011 
onwards have a military and security tenor, pointing the migrant as the 
central problem. The analyzed policies seem to have the objective of 
creating a fortressed Europe and block migrants from escaping their 
countries, forcing them to an unhuman life or to an unhuman death. 
Paradoxically, this strategy has not worked so far and after the 
militarization of one part of the Mediterranean, what smugglers have done 
is change their routes, shifting their ways to Greece through Turkey and 
Egypt or using land routes through the Balkans.58 A more humanitarian and 
 
57  See European Union External Action, EUBAM in Libya. Online at: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eubam-libya/. Last date of 
access: 01.08.2015. 
58  Sutherland, Peter, Europe’s Race to the Bottom on Refugees, Project Syndicate¸ 
London, June 2015. Online at: http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ 
 european-union-mediterranean-refugee-crisis-by-peter-sutherland-2015-06.  
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effective development aid policy would help tackling the root causes of 
people risking their lives on a daily basis.59 
The initiatives taken so far feel somehow distant of what the European 
Union’s values are meant to be: security, freedom and justice. But whose 
security, whose justice and whose freedom? Apparently only for those who 
were fortunate enough to be born at a later date inside the European Union. 
3.3 European Union solidarity 
3.3.1 Burden-sharing 
The media and politicians have used – or abused – the term burden-sharing 
when reporting or talking about migration, especially concerning the 
current situation in Italy, Malta or Greece.  
The idea of burden sharing in relation to refugees stems from international 
law and goes back to the 1950s. The most notable ideas, rules and 
guidelines concerning refugees are laid down in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and the Protocol of 1967, as well as the statues of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).60 The refugee regime 
is composed by two aspects: the obligation of countries on refugees that 
arrive to their territory and the voluntary, not legally binding responsibility 
towards those refugees that have not reached their territory. The first one 
has a clear and defined framework that obliges States to take particular care 
of the ones in need. The second one has a voluntary and solidary aspect, 
depending mostly on the willingness of regional or neighboring countries 
to share the responsibility of refugees. The so called burden sharing falls in 
the second category and is left to regional or international cooperation to 
apply it or not.  
 
59  Calleya, Stephen, Time for a Euro-Mediterranean Migration Policy, in: ZEI 
Insights, Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI), No. 19, April 2015. 
Online at: https://www.zei.uni-bonn.de/dateien/zei-insights/calleya_19-1. 
 Last date of access: 10.12.2015. 
60  Betts, Alexander, International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Regime: The 
role of interconnections, Online at: https://www.princeton.edu/.../International% 
 20Coop. Last date of access: 10.12.2015. 
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Within the meaning of burden-sharing, two kind of support can be 
differentiated: the financial and the physical burden-sharing. The first one 
is aimed at providing economic help to those countries experiencing high 
volumes of asylum seekers and refugees, which in turn are usually less 
developed and structured.61 The second one refers to an actual resettlement 
of people to other countries, which can be for a period of time or 
permanently.62  
In the current situation, the usage of burden-sharing in media and by 
politicians refers to the physical help. In order to better organize and ensure 
the well-being of the asylum seekers and refugees in countries like Italy or 
Greece, the EU has proposed a relocation and resettlement of refugees 
among the 28 Member Countries. This would mean a temporal suspension 
of the Dublin system, which is the reason many asylum seekers are sent 
back to the southern European countries, through which they first entered 
the EU.  
United Kingdom and Hungary strongly oppose this initiative, and have 
opted-out of the relocation scheme, as well as Denmark, which already has 
a special status with the EU when it comes to Justice and Home Affairs.63 
The last Council of Home Affairs Ministers ended with a lower number of 
relocations than the 40,000 promised by the head of states.64 EU solidarity 
is challenged on every issue and at every level by populist and national 
political speeches and discourses. It seems impossible to change this kind 
of political reaction towards sensitive issues like migration or asylum, but it 
could be possible to change the structure and rules included in the CEAS. 
The current configuration of the CEAS has caused much criticism 
concerning the solidarity and responsibility sharing within the EU. 
 
61  Boswell, Christina, Burden Sharing in the New Age of Migration, Washington: 
Migration Policy Institute, 11/2003. Online at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org 
 /article/burden-sharing-new-age-immigration. Last date of access: 10.12.2015. 
62  Ibid (61). 
63  Euranet Plus News Agency, EU fails to agree on migrant burden sharing, 
Euranetplus-inside.eu, July 2015. Online at: http://euranetplus-inside.eu/eu-failed-
to-agree-on-migrant-burden-sharing/. Last date of access: 10.12.2015.  
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According to Lillian Langford the current composition of the CEAS 
presents three main threats to the EU solidarity:  
 First, the State of First Arrival rule overburdens the southern states, 
often deficient in structures and human resources. The procedures lay down 
by the Dublin System trigger conflicts between countries, sending asylum 
seekers back and forth, usually forgetting the human aspect of the issue.65  
 Second, even if there have been attempts to harmonize and have 
coherent migration policies in all Member States, this is not the case yet. 
There is great disparity in the way regimes work, causing mistrust and 
hostility between States.66  
Good examples to understand the problematic are the latest sentences of the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, where both courts ruled that if a Member State sends an asylum 
seeker back to a country where his or her rights could be violated, the 
sender country is liable for it. Even if the country has a good asylum 
management system and the rights of the migrant are respected, the fact 
that the country is legally – according to the Dublin Regulation – sending 
the person back to a place where the system is not well established, can 
seem somehow unfair.67  
 Third, CEAS restricts the potential of Frontex to achieve solidarity 
and understanding among States. The agency has been highly criticized for 
violating human rights in the border control practices, partly due to the 
dependence of the state-level politics and not being able to work in an 
autonomous way. Frontex could help to harmonize asylum regimes and to 
be an example of good practices for all the countries. Instead, tensions arise 
by the way some situations and events have been militarily approached.68  
 
65  Langford, Lillian M., The other Euro crisis: Rights Violations Under the European 
Common Asylum System and the Unraveling of EU Solidarity, Harvard Human 
Rights Journal, Vol. 26, Cambridge, 2014: 216-220. 
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The current structure and functioning of CEAS could be improved, closer 
to the Union’s core values – “human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality 
and the respect of human rights, including the rights of persons belonging 
to minorities”.69 
3.3.2 European Asylum Support Office 
A further effort done by the European Union concerning solidarity and the 
creation of a coherent framework in migration and asylum is the 
establishment of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). Founded in 
2010, this center works as a place of expertise, coordination, practical and 
technical support as well as an input for EU policy-making.70 At a practical 
level, EASO has been cooperating with different Member States to 
approach the asylum applications situation in the Mediterranean. Example 
of that are Italy and Greece, which requested the help and support of EASO 
to plan and implement projects, to access EU funds and other financial 
help, to train personnel active in this field and get Country of Origin 
Information.71  
The work of EASO plays an important role in moments where States are 
overwhelmed, as is the case in Mediterranean countries since 2011. 
Nevertheless, the agency does not solve the essential problems that asylum 
and migration policies currently present in the EU. Establishing plans at a 
local level without reforming the higher structures of this policy will tend 
to fail to achieve real solidarity and respect to human rights.72As Langford 
argues, the most important reform of the regulatory regime falls on the 
amendment of the State of First Arrival rule, which will represent the door 
to a new stage where human rights can be better ensured, solidarity can 
become a reality and CEAS will get a more independent position vis-à-vis 
national interests. It is also true that at the end of the day, the European 
 
69  See Treaty on the European Union¸ Art. 2, § 5, Treaty of Lisbon, 2007. 
70  See European Asylum Support Office, What is EASO, Online at: 
https://easo.europa.eu/about-us/what-is-easo/. Last date of access: 03.08.2015. 
71  See European Asylum Support Office, EASO and Greece sign agreement to 
continue EASO support to Greece until May 2016, Press Release, 19.05.2015.  
 Online at: https://easo.europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/20150513-Press-release-
signing-of-the-SSP-2.pdf. Last date of access: 10.12.2015.  
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Union is made of sovereign States with diverse, occasionally differing, 
interests and priorities. It is up to them to take the steps to an in-depth 
reform of this policy area. The overlapping of the migration crisis in the 
Mediterranean and the economic crisis in a substantial part of Europe, with 
strong focus on Mediterranean countries, does not seem to encourage a 
reform of the asylum and migration policy.  
4. The securitization of migration 
The way migration is perceived and approached has changed during the 
past decades. As mentioned above, this phenomenon is currently seen as a 
threat to the stability and integrity of the European nation-states. The 
migrant is portrayed as a danger to the European society at many levels, 
especially by politicians and media. Thus we could say that migration has 
been securitized in the past years, with a big emphasis on those arriving to 
Europe through the Mediterranean Sea.  
The way in which a phenomenon becomes a security issue that was 
formerly not perceived as such, is explained at the “Securitization Theory”, 
developed by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde at the University 
of Copenhagen. In the mid-90s, these and other scholars – known as the 
Copenhagen School – developed a theory by which subjects would become 
a matter of security through speech-acts.73 The speech-acts would mainly 
be held by politicians or authorities able to create public opinion and have 
an influence in society as well as to take actions against the threat. 
Arguably is the role that media develop in the securitization process, if they 
either play a central role in the creation of public opinion or merely 
function as a megaphone of politics.  
According to the theory, there are three main components and three main 
steps to securitize a topic: the main components are (1) a securitizing actor 
or agent (usually politician or authority), (2) a referent object (ideal or 
object that is being threatened and needs to be protected) and (3) an 
audience (target that needs to be persuaded and accept the securitization 
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process of the issue). The three steps to a successful securitization are the 
presentation of “existential threats”, the need of an “emergency action” and 
the “effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules”.74 
The security agenda has been broadened and deepened in the last decades, 
including not only state and military levels, but also sub-state groups, such 
as “human security” or “societal security”.75 According to the Copenhagen 
School, there are several sectors of securitization: the military sector has 
the territorial integrity as the referent object, the political sector focuses on 
the legitimacy of the government and the societal sector has cultural flows, 
economic integration and population movements as the referent object.76 In 
the case of migration we would refer to the societal level as the threatened 
object, being at stake the loss of identity and we-ness sense. The 
Copenhagen School argues that if a society loses its identity, it will no 
longer be capable of existing at itself, of preserving the feeling of unity 
among the members. Bill McSweeney argues that the danger of identifying 
one society with one identity – omitting the changing nature of it as well as 
the possibility of having a multi-identity community –, is the potential of 
unconsciously enhancing the development of racist and xenophobe ideas 
among people.77  
So, what is security? What happens when an issue is securitized? 
According to Ole Wæver, security is a speech-act. The usage of the word 
turns the topic into it. “By saying it, something is done (as in betting, 
giving a promise, naming a ship)”. 78 In the utterance of security, the 
securitizing actor influences a different development of a given area, 
turning it into an existential threat that justifies the blockage of it by any 
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means.79 The term security is difficult to define and is usually linked to 
images and feelings rather than to an abstract thought. McSweeny connects 
the noun with a “solid object” such as a lock, alarm or weapon, used to 
protect against danger and attack.80  
The last step to have a successful process of securitization is to have an 
audience that receives the message and accepts it, agreeing with the 
securitizing actor about the perils of the issue. To achieve this stage, a 
relationship to the threat or enemy has to be built. This goes through a 
process of division between “us” and “them”. 81  The creation of two 
opposing categories or groups is essential to discriminate who are our 
friends and our enemies. The groups do not have to exist in advance; the 
speech-act can be the one creating the previously inexistent divisions. In 
societal security, this division remains crucial to preserve the identity and 
the existence of the community.  
In Europe, migration has become a security issue through speeches and has 
been institutionalized as such through the implementation of measures and 
laws that forget the human aspect of the current situation in the 
Mediterranean.
 
79  Ibid (75). 
80  Ibid (77). 
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